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[L.A. No. 27674.

In Bank. April 21, 1964.]

CHESTER M. VANDERMARK et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY et al., Defendants
and Respondents.
[1] Products Liability-Evidence.-In an action against an automobile manufacturer and an automobile retailer for injuries
sustained in an accident allegedly caused by the sudden failure
of the automobile's braking system, it was error to strike an
expert's testimony as to the possible causes of the braking
system's failure and to reject plaintiffs' offer to prove that all
of the possible causes were attributable to defendants, particularly where damage to the ear precluded determining
whether or not the brake master cylinder assembly had heen
properly installed and adjusted before the accident.
[2] Id.-Strict Liability of Manufacturer.-A manufacturer is
strictly liable in tort when he places an article on the market
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects
and the article proves to have a defect that causes injury to a
human being; such liability, being strict, encompasses defects
regardless of their source, and therefore a manufacturer of a
completed product cannot escape liability by tracing the defect
to a component part supplied by another.
[3] Id.-Strict Liability of Manufacturer.-The rules relating to
strict liability of It manufacturer for injuries caused by a
defective completed product focus responsibility for defects,
whether negligently or nonnegligently caused, on the manufacturer of the completed product, and they apply regardless

\

[2] Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by automobile or other vehicle, aircraft, boat, or their parts, supplies, and
equipment, note, 78 AL.R.2d 460. See also Am.J'ur.2d, Automobiles
and Highway Traffic, § 646; Am.Jur., Sales (1st ed § 799).
Melt. Dig. References: [1-5,7-11] Products Liability; [6] Negligence, § 111(8).
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of what part of the manufacturing process the manufaeturer
chooses to delegate to third parties.
14] Id.-Strict Liabiliq of K&nufacturer.-An automobile manufacturer who delivers ears to its dealers that are not ready
to be driveu away by the ultimate purchasers but relies on
its dealers to make the final inspections, corrections, and adjustments necessary to make the ears ready for use cannot
delegate its duty to have its ears delivered to the ultimate
consumer free from dangerous defects, and. thus it cannot
escape liability on the ground that a defect in a particular
car may have been caused by something one of its authorized I
dealers did or failed to do.
. .
[5] ld.-Strict Liablliq of Kanufacturer-N'onauit.-In All &etion against an automobile manufacturer for injuries sustained
in an accident allegedly caused by the sudden failure of the
automobile's braking system, it '\\'as error to grant a nonsuit :
on causes of aetion based on strict liability where plaintiffs I
introduced or offered substantial evidence that they were injured as a result of a defect that was present in the car when
the manufacturer's authorized dealer delivered it to plaintiff
driver.
(6] N'egligence-'1'rial-N'oDSuit.-In an action against an automobile manufacturer for injuries sustained in an aecident allegedly caused by the sudden failure of the automobile's braking system, it was error to grant a nonsuit on causes of action
based on negligence where plaintiffs introduced or offered substantial evidence that tbe defect was caused by some negligent
conduct for which the manufacturer was responsible.
[7] Products Liabiliq-Strict Liablliq of Retailer.-Retailers,
like manufacturers, are engaged in the business of distributing
goods to the public and are an integral part of the overall
producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost
of injuries from defective products.
[8] ld.-Strict Liability of Retailer.-A. a retailer engaged in the
business of distributing goods to the public, an automobile
dealer is strictly liable in tort for personal injuries caused by
defects in cars sold by it.
[9] Id.-8trict Liabiliq of Retailer.-In an action against an
automobile retailer for injuries sustained in an accident allegedlyeaused by the SUdden failure of the automobile's
braking ~ystelll, it was immaterial that defendant restricted
its contractual liability to ,the purchaser of the car, since it
was strictly liable in tort. I
110] Id.-Strict Liabiliq of Retailer.-The requirement of timely
notice of breach of warranty (Civ. Code, § 1769) is not applicable to the strict tort liability of an automobile dealer
who sells a defective automobile.
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[11] Id.-Strict Liability of Retailer-Directed Verdict.-In an
action against an automobile retailer for injuries sustained in
an accident allegedly caused by the sudden failure of the
automobile's braking system, although plaintiffs sought to impose strict liability on the retailer on the theory of sales-act
warranties which allegedly were not applicable due to a disclaimer in the retailer's contract with the purchaser of the
car and failure to give timely notice of breach of warranty, it
was error to direct a verdict for the retailer where plaintiffs
pleaded and introduced substantial evidence of all of the facts
necessary to establish strict liability in tort.

APPEAL from judgmentc:; of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Arthur Crum, Judge. One judgment
affirmed in part and reversed in part; other judgment reversed.
Action for personal injuries sustained by plaintiffs in an
automobile accident allegedly caused by the sudden failure of
the car's braking system. Judgment of nonsuit in favor of
defen~ant automobile manufacturer reversed; judgment for
defendant automobile dealer affirmed in part and reversed in
part.

J

Edward L. Lascher and Donald C. Lozano for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
Eugene P. Fay, Edward I. Pollock and Pollock, Pollock &
Fay as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Dryden, Harrington, Horgan & Swartz, Vernon G. Foster,
Moss, Lyon & Dunn, Gerold C. Dunn and Henry F. Walker
for Defendants and Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-In October 1958 plaintiff Chester Vandermark bought a new Ford automobile from defendant Lorimer
Diesel Engine Company, an authorized Ford dealer doing
business as Maywood Bell Ford. About six weeks later, while •
driving on the San Bernardino Freeway, he lost control of
the car. It went off the highway to the right and collided with
a light post. He and his sister, plaintiff Mary Tresham, suffered serious injuries. They brought this action for damages
against Maywood Bell Ford and the Ford Motor Company,
which manufactured and assembled the car. They pleaded
causes of action for breach of warranty and negligence. The
trial court granted Ford's motion for a nonsuit on aU causes
. of action and directed a verdict in favor of Maywood Bell on.
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the warranty causes of action. The jury returned a verdict
for Maywood Bell on the negligence causes of action, and the
trial court entered judgment on the verdict. Plaintiffs appeal.
Vandermark had driven the car approximately 1,500 miles
before the accident. He used it primarily in town, but drove
it on two occasions from his home in Huntington Park to
Joshua Tree in San Bernardino County. He testified that the
car operated normally before the accident except once when
he was driving home from Joshua Tree. He was in the lefthand westbound lane of the San Bernardino Freeway
when traffic ahead slowed. He applied the brakes and the
car "started to make a little dive to the right and continued on across the two lanes of traffic till she hit the
shoulder. Whatever it was then let go and I was able
to then pull her back into the road. " He drove. home
without further difficulty, but before using the car again, he
took it to Maywood Bell for the regular 1,000-mile new car
servicing. He testified that he described the freeway incident
to Maywood Bell's service attendant, but Maywood Bell's
records do not indicate that any complaint was made.
After the car was serviced, Vandermark drove it in town
on short trips totaling approximately 300 miles. He and his
sister then set out on another trip to Joshua Tree. He testified that while driving in the right-hand lane of the freeway
at about 45 to 50 miles per hour, "the car started to make a
little shimmy or weave and started pulling to the right. . .. I
tried to pull back, but it didn't seem to come, so I applied
my brakes gently to see if I could straighten her up, but I
couldn't seem to pull her back to the left. So, I let off on the
brakes and she continued to the right, and I tried again to
put on the brakes and she wouldn't come back, and all of a
sudden this pole was in fro:r;tt of me and we smashed into
it. " Plaintiff Tresham testi:6~d to a substantially similar
version of the accideD~. A witness for plaintiffs, who was
driving about 200 feet behind them, testified that plaintiffs'
car was in the right-hand lane when he saw its taillights
come on. The car started to swerve and finally skidded into
the light post. An investigating officer testified that there
were skid marks leading from the highway to the car.
Plaintiffs called an expert on the 0peration of hydraulic
automobile brakes. In answer to hypothetical questions based
on evidence in the record and his own knowledge of the braking system of the car, the expert testified as to the cause of
the accident. It was his opinion that the brakes applied them-
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selves owing to a fai1ure of the piston in the master cylinder
to retract far enough when the brake pedal was released to
uncover a bypass port through which hydraulic fluid should
have been able to escape into a reservoir above the master cylinder. Failure of the piston to uncover the bypass
port led to a closed system and a partial application of th(>
brakes, whic)l in turn led to heating that expanded the brake
fluid until the brakes applied themselves with such force that
Vandermark lost control of the car. The expert also testified
that the failure of the piston to retract sufficiently to uncover
the bypass port could have been caused by dirt in the master
cylinder, a defective or wrong-sized part, distortion of the
firewall, or improper assembly or adjustment. [1] The
trial court struck the testimony of the possible causes of the
failure of the piston to retract, on the ground that there was
no direct evidence that anyone or more of the causes exist(>d,
and it rej(>cted plaintiffs offer to prove that all of the possible
causes were attributable to defendants. These rulings were
erroneous, for plaintiffs were entitled to establish the existence of a defect and defendants' r(>sponsibility therefor by
circumstantial evidence, particularly when, as in this case,
the damage to the car in the collision precluded determining
whether or not the master cylinder assembly had been properly installed and adjusted before the accident.
Accordingly, for the purposes of reviewhlg the nonsuit in
favor of Ford and the directed verdict in favor of Maywood
Bell on the warranty causes of action, it must be taken as
<,stablished that wIlen the car was delivered to Vandermark,
the master cylinder assembly had a defect that caused the
accident. Moreover, since it could reasonably be inferred
from the description of the braking system in evidence and
the offer of proof of all possible causes of defects that tIle
defect was owing to negligence in design, manufacture, assembly, or adjustment, it must be taken as established that
the defect was caused by some such negligence.
Ford contends, however, that it may not be held liable for
negligence in manufacturing the car or strictly liable in tort
for placing it on the market without proof that the car was
defective when Ford relin~uished control over it. Ford point"!
out that in this case the car passed through two oth(>r autllOrized Ford dealers before it was sold to Maywood Bell and
that Maywood Bell removed the power steering unit before
!!e1ling the car to Vandermark.
[2] In G,oeenman v. rllba PoU'er Products, Inc., 59 Cal.
2d 57, 62 [27 Cal.Rptr. 697,377 P.2d 897J, we held that "A
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mallufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he
places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to a human being." Since the liability is strict
it encompasses defects regardless of their source, and therefore a manufacturer of a completed product cannot escape
liability by tracing the defect to a component part supplied
by another. (GoZdberg v. KoZlsman Instrument Corp., 12
N.Y.2d432,437 [240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81].) Moreover, even before such strict liability was recognized, the
manufacturer of a completed product ,vas subject· to vicarious Jiability for the nE'gligence of his suppliers or subcontractors that resulted in defects in the completed product.
(Dow v. Holly Manufacturing Co., 49 Ca1.2d 720,·726-727
{321 P.2d 736]; Ford Motor Co. v. Matkis, 322 F.2d 267,
273; Boeing A.irpZane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310, 313; see
Rest., Torts, § 400.) [3] These rules focus responsibility
for defects, whether negligently or non negligently caused, on
the manufacture,r ·of tlle completed product, and they apply
regardless of what part of the manufacturing process the
manufacturer chooses to delegate to third parties. [4] It appears in the present case that Ford delegates the final steps
in that process to its authorized dealers. It does not deliver
cars to its dealers that are ready to be driven away by the
ultimate purchasers but relies on its dealers to make the final
inspections, corrections, and adjustments necessary to make
the cars ready for use. Since Ford, as the manufacturer of
the completed product, cannot delegate its duty to have its
cars delivered to the ultimate purchaser free from dangerous
defects, it cannot escape liability on the ground that the
defect in Vandermark's car may ha,-e been causE'd. by something one of its authorized dealers did or failed to do.
[5] Since plaintiffs introduced or offered substantial evidence that they were injured as a result of a defect that was
present in the car when Ford's authorized dealer delivered it
to Vandermark, the trial court erred in granting a nonsuit on
the causes of action by which plaintiffs sought to establis]l
that Ford was strictly liable to them. [6] Since plaintiffs
also introduced or offered substantial evidence that the defect
was caused by some negligent conduct for which Ford was
responsible, the trial court also erred in granting a nonsuit
on the causes of action by which plaintiffs sought to establish
that Ford was liable for negligence. I
Plaintiffs contend that Maywood Bell is also strictly liable

)
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in tort for the injuries caused by the defect in the car and
that therefore the trial court erred in directing a verdict
for Maywood Bell on the warranty causes of action. Maywood Bell contends that the rule of strict liability in the
Greenman case applies only to actions against manufacturers
brought by injured parties with whom the manufacturers did
not deal. It contends t11at it validly disclaimed warranty
liability for personal injuriE's in its contract with Vandermarkl (see Civ. Code, § 1791 j Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co.,
42 Ca1.2d 682, 693 [268 P.2d 1041]), and that in any event
neitller plaintiff gave it timely notice of breach of warranty.
(Civ. Code § 1769.)
[7] Retailers like manufacturers are engaged in the business of distributing goods to the public. They are an integral
part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that
should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defE'ctive product'). (See Greenman v. Y1lba Power Prodl/cis, Inc., 59 Cal.
2d 57, 63 [27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897].) In some cases
the retailer may be the only member of that enterprise reasonably available to the injured plaintiff. In other cases the
retailer himself may play a substantial part in insuring that
the product is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure
on the manufacturer to that end; the retailer's strict liability thus serves as an added incentive to safety. Strict liability on the manufacturer and retailer alike affords maximum
protection to the injured plaintiff and works no injustice to
IThe wuranty clause of the contract provided: "Dealer warrants to
Purchaser (except as hereinafter provided) each part of each Ford
Motor Comp8llY product Bold by Dealer to Purchaser to be free under
normal use and service from defeets in material and workmanship for a
period of ninety (90) days from the date of delivery of such product to
Purchaser, or until such product has been driven, used or operated for n
distance of four thousand (4,000) miles, whichever event first shall
occur. Dealer makes no waTTllnty whatsocv('r with respect to tires or
tubes. Dealer's obligation under this warranty is limited to replacement,
without charge to Purchaser, of such parts as shall be returned to
Dealer and as shall be acknowledged by Dealer to be defective. This
warranty shall not apply to any Ford Motor Company product that lUIS
been subject to misuse, negligence, or accident, or in which parts Dot
made or supplted by Ford Motor Company shall haTe been used if, in
the determination of Dealer, such use shall have affected its perform·
anee, stability, or reliability, or .hich shall have been altered or reo
paired outside of Dealer's place of business in a manner which, in the
determination of Dealer, shall have affeeted its performance. stability,
or reliability. This warranty is expressly in lieu of all other warranties,
express or implied, and of all other obligatiolls on the part of Dealer."
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the defendants, for they can adjust the costs of such protection between them in the course of their continuing business
relationship. [8] Accordingly, as a retailer engaged in the
business of distributing goods to the public, Maywood Bell is
strictly liable in tort for personal injuries caused by defects
in cars sold by it. (See Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195,
200 [213 N.Y.S.2d 39, 173 N.E.2d 773] ; McBurnette v. Playground Equipment Corp. (Fla.) 137 So.2d 563, 566-567;
Graham v. Butterfield's Inc., 176 Kan. 68 [269 P.2d 413,
418) ; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,406
[161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R.2d 1]; State Farm Mut. AlIto. Ins.
Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 25~ Iowa 1289 [110 N.W.2d 449,
455-456] ; Rest.2d Torts (Tent. Draft No.7) § 402A, com. f.)
[9] Since Maywood Bell is strictly liable in tort, the fact
that it restricted its contractual liability to Vandermark is
immaterial. Regardless of the obligations it assumed by contract, it is subject to strict liability in tort because it is in the
business of selling automobiles, one of which proved to be
defective and caused injury to human beings. [10] The
requirement of timely notice of breach of warranty (Civ.
Code, § 1769) is not applicable to such tort liability just as it
is not applicable to tort liability based on negligence (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 60-62 [27
Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897] ; see Rest.2d Torts (Tent. Draft
No.7) § 402A, com. m). Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Ca1.2d 826
[193 P.2d 1], and Vogel v. Thrifty Drug Co., 43 Ca1.2d 184
[272 P.2d 1], on which Maywood Bell relies, dealt only with
warranties arising under the uniform sales act (Civ. Code,
§§ 1721-1800); neither of them considered the question
whether the defendant might be subject to strict tort liability
not arising under that act.
[11] Although plaintiffs sought to impose strict liability
on Maywood Bell on the theory of sales-act warranties, they
pleaded and introduced substantial evidence of all of the
facts necessary to establish strict liability in tort. Accordingly,
the trial court erred in directing a verdict for Maywood Bell
on the so-called warranty causes of action.
Plaintiffs contend finally that v~rious prejudicial errors
were committed in presenting the negligence causes of action
to the jury and that therefore the judgment in favor of Maywood Bell on those causes of action should be reversed. The
issue of Maywood Bell's liability for negligence was fully
litigated. Although the evidence was in sharp conflict, we are
convinced from an exa.mination of tlle record that no prej-
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udicial error occurred in presenting the negligence causes
of action to the jury.
The judgment of nonsuit in favor of Ford Motor Company
is reversed. The judgment in favor of Maywood Bell Ford on
the negligence causes of action is affirmed and in all other
respects the judgment in favor of Maywood Bell Ford is
reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J.,
ner, J., and Peek, J., concurred.
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